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Aaron Blankstein
2018-12-19 15:51:12 -06:00
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sip/sip-001-burn-election.md
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@@ -59,42 +59,48 @@ so the underlying burn chain can be "swapped out" at a later date if need be.
## 5. Fair mining pools
Related to point 3, it is difficult to participate in block mining in proof-of-work blockchain.
This is because a would-be miner needs to lock up a huge initial amount of capital in
dedicated mining hardware, and a miner receives no rewards for blocks that are
not incorporated into the main chain. Joining a mining pool is a risky alternative,
Related to point 3, it is difficult to participate in block mining in
a proof-of-work blockchain. This is because a would-be miner needs to
lock up a huge initial amount of capital in dedicated mining hardware,
and a miner receives no rewards for blocks that are not incorporated
into the main chain. Joining a mining pool is a risky alternative,
because the pool operator can simply abscond with the block reward or
dole out block rewards in an unfair way.
dole out block rewards in an unfair way.
The Stacks blockchain addresses this problem in two ways: by providing a provably-fair way to
mine blocks in a pool, and by distributing some rewards to runner-up leaders as part
of its election algorithm. To implement mining pools, users aggregate their individually-small burns
to produce a large burn, which in turn gives them all a non-negligeable chance
to mine a block. The leader election protocol is aware of these burns, and
rewards users proportional to their contributions _without the need for a pool
operator_. This both lowers the barrier to entry in participating in mining,
and removes the risk of operating in traditional mining pools. A similar
technique is used to give runner-up miners a (smaller) share in the block reward.
The Stacks blockchain addresses this problem in two ways: by providing
a provably-fair way to mine blocks in a pool, and by distributing some
rewards to runner-up leaders as part of its election algorithm. To
implement mining pools, users aggregate their individually-small burns
to produce a large burn, which in turn gives them all a
non-negligeable chance to mine a block. The leader election protocol
is aware of these burns, and rewards users proportional to their
contributions _without the need for a pool operator_. This both
lowers the barrier to entry in participating in mining, and removes
the risk of operating in traditional mining pools. A similar
technique is used to give runner-up miners a (smaller) share in the
block reward.
## Assumptions
Given the design goals, the Stacks leader election protocol makes the following
assumptions:
* Deep forks in the burn chain are exponentially rarer as a function of their
length.
* Deep forks in the burn chain are exponentially rarer as a function
of their length.
* Deep forks in the burn chain occur for reasons unrelated to the Stacks protocol execution. That
is, miners do not attempt to manipulate the execution of the Stacks protocol
by reorganizing the burn chain.
* Deep forks in the burn chain occur for reasons unrelated to the
Stacks protocol execution. That is, miners do not attempt to
manipulate the execution of the Stacks protocol by reorganizing the
burn chain.
* Burn chain miners do not censor all Stacks transactions (i.e. liveness is
possible).
* At least 2/3 of the Stacks leader candidates (measured by burn weight) are correct and honest.
* At least 2/3 of the Stacks leader candidates (measured by burn
weight) are correct and honest.
* The majority of users (by burn weight) who help leaders get elected only help
known-honest leaders.
* The majority of users (by burn weight) who help leaders get elected
only help known-honest leaders.
# Protocol overview
@@ -180,7 +186,7 @@ blocks. It does so via burn mining, whereby would-be leaders submit their candi
to be leaders by burning an existing cryptocurrency. A leader is selected to produce a
block based on two things:
* the fraction of cryptocurrency the burned relative to the other candidates
* the amount of cryptocurrency burned relative to the other candidates
* an unbiased source of randomness
A new leader is selected whenever the burn chain produces a new block -- the
@@ -207,12 +213,13 @@ network as the leader of a future block.
## Committing to a chain tip
Because anyone can become a leader, this means that even misbehaving leaders can
be selected. If a leader crashes before it can propagate their blocks, or if
it produces an invalid block, then no block will be appended to the
leader's chain tip during its epoch. Also, if a leader is operating off of
stale data, then the leader _may_ produce a block
whose parent is not the latest block on the "best" fork.
Because anyone can become a leader, this means that even misbehaving
leaders can be selected. If a leader crashes before it can propagate
their blocks, or if it produces an invalid block, then no block will
be appended to the leader's chain tip during its epoch. Also, if a
leader is operating off of stale data, then the leader _may_ produce a
block whose parent is not the latest block on the "best" fork. These
kinds of failures must be tolerated by the Stacks blockchain.
A consequence of tolerating these failed leaders is that the Stacks blockchain
may have multiple competing forks; one of which is considered the canonical fork