fix($parse): disallow passing Function to Array.sort

Fix the following exploit:

    hasOwnProperty.constructor.prototype.valueOf = valueOf.call;
    ["a", "alert(1)"].sort(hasOwnProperty.constructor);

The exploit:
• 1. Array.sort takes a comparison function and passes it 2 parameters to compare.
  2. It then calls .valueOf() if the result is not a primitive.
• The Function object conveniently accepts two string arguments so we can use this
  to construct a function.  However, this doesn't do much unless we can execute it.
• We set the valueOf function on Function.prototype to Function.prototype.call.
  This causes the function that we constructed to be executed when sort calls
  .valueOf() on the result of the comparison.

The fix is in two parts.
• Disallow passing unsafe objects to function calls as parameters.
• Do not traverse the Function object when setting a path.

test/ng/parseSpec.js

@@ -725,6 +725,43 @@ describe('parser', function() {
                     'Expression: a.toString.constructor = 1');
           });
 
+          it('should disallow traversing the Function object in a setter: E02', function() {
+            expect(function() {
+              // This expression by itself isn't dangerous.  However, one can use this to
+              // automatically call an object (e.g. a Function object) when it is automatically
+              // toString'd/valueOf'd by setting the RHS to Function.prototype.call.
+              scope.$eval('hasOwnProperty.constructor.prototype.valueOf = 1');
+            }).toThrowMinErr(
+                    '$parse', 'isecfn', 'Referencing Function in Angular expressions is disallowed! ' +
+                    'Expression: hasOwnProperty.constructor.prototype.valueOf = 1');
+          });
+
+          it('should disallow passing the Function object as a parameter: E03', function() {
+            expect(function() {
+              // This expression constructs a function but does not execute it.  It does lead the
+              // way to execute it if one can get the toString/valueOf of it to call the function.
+              scope.$eval('["a", "alert(1)"].sort(hasOwnProperty.constructor)');
+            }).toThrow();
+          });
+
+          it('should prevent exploit E01', function() {
+            // This is a tracking exploit.  The two individual tests, it('should … : E02') and
+            // it('should … : E03') test for two parts to block this exploit.  This exploit works
+            // as follows:
+            //
+            // • Array.sort takes a comparison function and passes it 2 parameters to compare.  If
+            //   the result is non-primitive, sort then invokes valueOf() on the result.
+            // • The Function object conveniently accepts two string arguments so we can use this
+            //   to construct a function.  However, this doesn't do much unless we can execute it.
+            // • We set the valueOf property on Function.prototype to Function.prototype.call.
+            //   This causes the function that we constructed to be executed when sort calls
+            //   .valueOf() on the result of the comparison.
+            expect(function() {
+              scope.$eval('' +
+                'hasOwnProperty.constructor.prototype.valueOf=valueOf.call;' +
+                '["a","alert(1)"].sort(hasOwnProperty.constructor)');
+            }).toThrow();
+          });
 
           it('should NOT allow access to Function constructor that has been aliased', function() {
             scope.foo = { "bar": Function };